What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package deal of reforms supposed to transform the country from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called protesters terrorists and requested assist from the Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Organization to quell mass unrest, citizens will take part in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will happen on June 5, only one month after the proposed reforms have been released. The reform package addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the overall constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are said to remodel Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a strong parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union address on March 16.

A brilliant-presidential system is one the place parliaments and courts are only nominally independent, and the president and their administration have practically limitless control over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a new structure in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev further consolidated his personal powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev started to loosen the president’s management with constitutional amendments in 2017 that barely redistributed presidential powers to other branches of presidency and opened the trail for the election of native representatives, not less than on the village stage. However, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his private management over Kazakhstan’s politics by together with provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or chief of the nation.

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The proposed constitutional reforms strip the constitution of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued signal of the Nazarbayev family’s fall from grace. 

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In addition to sidelining Nazarbayev, several proposed provisions would barely restrict the power of the president. The president should not be a member of a political occasion, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva called “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this amendment, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat celebration – a rebranded model of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan celebration – on April 26. Additionally, the president can now not override the acts of akims of oblasts, main cities, or the capital and close family members of the president can not hold political posts.

Several proposed measures give parliament extra energy vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will stay bicameral, however the distribution of power between the higher and decrease houses will shift considerably. The Senate will not have the power to make new legal guidelines, and as an alternative will just approve or reject laws passed by the Mazhilis. Moreover, the process for selecting deputies to both houses will change. 

First, the Mazhilis will probably be reduced to 98 deputies, following the abolition of nine seats appointed by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. Those seats will likely be transferred to the Senate, and the Assembly of the Peoples will now only get to appoint five deputies. The variety of deputies appointed by the president shall be reduced from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies might be elected in keeping with a combined system. Seventy % of Mazhilis deputies might be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 p.c might be instantly elected.

The only proposed adjustments to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court docket. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Courtroom until the adoption of the 1995 structure, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president nonetheless maintains a strong affect over the Constitutional Court’s make-up, however, with the power to select the courtroom’s chairman and 4 of the judges; parliament chooses the other three.

Tokayev has emphasised the significance of native governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that may bring government our bodies nearer to the populations they signify. Maybe probably the most disappointing aspect of proposed reforms is the dearth of great motion on native illustration for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, major cities, and the capital – nevertheless, the candidates can have been chosen by the president. The appropriate to elect local leadership has been some of the constant demands from Almaty residents, and this attempt to create selection is ultimately cosmetic.

The proposed reforms are vital steps toward real representative authorities in Kazakhstan; however, they do not essentially constitute forward movement. Many of the amendments are simply reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential power that beforehand existed, reasonably than materially changing the connection between state and society, as Tokayev claims.